What are the cases and what do they have in common?

1. At the beginning of the paper, Gendler presents four cases in which (in her view) standard
folk psychology fails to make sense of behavior, requiring us to posit a new intentional state.
What are the cases and what do they have in common? Is it true that standard folk
psychology cannot explain our behavior in these cases?

2. What exactly is an alief, according to Gendler? Is her proposed account adequate?

3. Can “alief” be regarded as a variety of belief or imagining?

4. Do studies of “priming” indicate that alief plays a larger role in behavior than many had
thought?

5. In Section V, Gendler discusses a story about ancient Athens related by Hume. She claims
that Hume is here pointing out that judgment about a particular case may be driven as
much by alief as by belief. Is this a reasonable interpretation?

6. Do Gendlers arguments support her conclusion that Belief plays an important role in the
ultimate regulation of behavior. But it plays a far smaller role in moment-by-moment
management than philosophical tradition has tended to stress?

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